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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1121 
___________ 
 
ANTONIO ROSELLO, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN F.C.I. ALLENWOOD 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3-17-cv-01580) 
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6  
May 17, 2017 
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: May 24, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Antonio Rosello, a federal prisoner currently confined in FCI-
Allenwood, has appealed the order of the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania dismissing his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.  The Government has filed a motion for summary affirmance.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we will grant the Government’s motion and summarily affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In 1996, Rosello was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida of numerous offenses, including Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to 
commit Hobbs Act robbery, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a 
crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  See S.D. Fla. 1:95-cr-0114.  He was 
sentenced to a total of 45 years’ imprisonment.  He appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed.  In 2002, Rosello filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Southern 
District of Florida.  The District Court denied the motion on the merits, and the Eleventh 
Circuit denied his request for a certificate of appealability. 
 In 2016, Rosello filed an application in the Eleventh Circuit requesting permission 
to file a second or successive motion under § 2255.  He sought to challenge his 
conviction under § 924(c) based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).  In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the so-called 
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is unconstitutionally vague.1  
                                              
1 A defendant is subject to ACCA’s enhanced punishment if he has three or more 
previous convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony.”  § 924(e)(1).  The 
statute defines “violent felony” to cover a felony that “(i) has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is 
3 
135 S. Ct. at 2557.  Rosello argued that § 924(c)’s residual clause is also 
unconstitutionally vague,2 that his predicate offenses of Hobbs Act robbery and 
conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery consequently no longer qualified as “crimes of 
violence,” and that he is therefore innocent of the § 924(c) offense.  The Eleventh Circuit 
denied the application.  See C.A. No. 16-13529.  The Court concluded that § 924(c)’s 
residual clause—the only part of the statute that was arguably affected by Johnson—was 
not implicated because Rosello’s conviction for Hobbs Act robbery satisfied § 924(c)’s 
separate elements clause.  Therefore, the Court ruled that Rosello had not made a prima 
facie showing that Johnson undermined his § 924(c) conviction. 
 Rosello then filed the petition under § 2241 that is at issue in this appeal.3  He 
raised the same Johnson-based challenge to his § 924(c) conviction that he asserted in his 
                                              
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  § 924(e)(2)(B) 
(emphasis added).  The underlined portion of subpart (ii) is known as the “residual 
clause.” 
2 Section 924(c) provides sentences for, as relevant here, “any person who, during and in 
relation to any crime of violence . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of 
any such crime, possesses a firearm.”  § 924(c)(1)(A).  The statute then provides that 
“‘crime of violence’ means an offense that is a felony and (A) has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of 
another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the 
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”  
§ 924(c)(3).  Subsection (A) is known as the “elements clause” and subsection (B) is 
known as the “residual clause.”  We have not yet decided whether § 924(c)’s residual 
clause is void for vagueness under Johnson.  See United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 
137, 141 (3d Cir. 2016). 
3 Venue was proper in the District Court here because Rosello is incarcerated within the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004). 
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§ 2244 application in the Eleventh Circuit.  The District Court dismissed the petition, 
concluding that Rosello’s claim could be raised only, if at all, in a § 2255 motion.  
Rosello then filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and review its factual 
findings for clear error.  See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (per curiam).   
 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.  “Motions pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge 
their convictions or sentences[.]”  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 
2002).  As we have explained, “under the explicit terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, unless a 
§ 2255 motion would be ‘inadequate or ineffective,’ a habeas corpus petition under 
§ 2241 cannot be entertained by the court.”  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538 (quoting § 2255(e)).  
“A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective only where the petitioner demonstrates that 
some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording 
him a full hearing and adjudication of his wrongful detention claim.”  Id. at 538.  This 
exception is narrow and applies in only rare circumstances.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 
F.3d 245, 251-52 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 
170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 Rosello argues that this exception applies here.  He relies on our decision in 
Dorsainvil, where we ruled that a petitioner can use § 2241 if he “had no earlier 
opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in 
5 
substantive law may negate.” 119 F.3d at 251.  However, the petitioner in Dorsainvil was 
categorically unable to pursue his claim in a second or successive § 2255 motion because 
the intervening Supreme Court decision he relied on4 “did not establish a new rule of 
constitutional law”—as § 2255(h)(2) requires—“but simply interpreted a substantive 
criminal statute.”  Id. at 247-48; see also Bruce, 868 F.3d at 179 (“the saving clause 
permits a prisoner to challenge his detention when a change in statutory interpretation 
raises the potential that he was convicted of conduct that the law does not make 
criminal”); Poe v. LaRiva, 834 F.3d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Because § 2255(h) 
already provides a remedy for new constitutional cases, these types of cases would not 
fall under the Savings Clause, which is available only if the remedy under § 2255 is 
‘inadequate or ineffective.’”). 
Rosello’s Johnson claim, meanwhile, is precisely the type of constitutional claim 
that can be pursued in a second or successive § 2255 motion.  Rosello complains that the 
Eleventh Circuit improperly rejected the merits of his claim in denying authorization to 
file a second or successive motion, but this just points up the fact that no “limitation of 
scope or procedure” prevented him from receiving a full adjudication.  Indeed, the 
Eleventh Circuit has previously granted similar applications.  See, e.g., In re Gomez, 830 
F.3d 1225, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Pinder, 824 F.3d 977, 979 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(per curiam).  The fact that the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Rosello’s claim lacked 
                                              
4 Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). 
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merit does not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective.  See Gardner v. Warden 
Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 2017).   
 Accordingly, we will grant the Government’s motion and summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.5 
                                              
5 Rosello has also filed a “Motion to Supplement Pleading Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(d),” in which he discusses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 
138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).  However, notwithstanding Dimaya, for the reasons discussed 
above, § 2241 is not the appropriate vehicle for Rosello to use to pursue his claims.  To 
the extent that Rosello seeks any further relief in his motion (beyond merely asking us to 
consider Dimaya), the motion is denied. 
